Step change often occurs when worlds that do not normally interact begin to communicate with each other in ways in which collaboration replaces competition. An example of this, driven by U.S. national interests in maintaining predominance in semiconductor manufacturing, is a company called SEMATECH (SEmiconductor MAnufacturing TECHnology). SEMATECH may also be an example of how the public and private sectors might now begin to work together in the all-important area of biomarkers in cancer drug development. We are in a new era in which targeted therapies make the diagnosis-treatment paradigm central to rational drug development-a paradigm that will ultimately culminate in personalized medicine for people with, or at risk for, cancer. Biomarkers and surrogate endpoints are central to the successful development of medicines to treat and prevent cancer in the 21st century. For this reason, it is an area that merits greater collaboration.
SEMATECH [1] was formed in 1987 by 13 firms representing 80% of the U.S. semiconductor manufacturing capacity and the U.S. government, with each side contributing $500 million over 5 years in a public-private partnership that would explore how to solve the critical problems of the day in computer chip manufacture: the density and heat of semiconductors. The research was precompetitive, the risks were shared, and collaboration replaced competition. What evolved were new ways to standardize equipment, supply chain, and manufacture semiconductors in a way from which all companies could derive benefit. As a result, the U.S. re-established its predominance in semiconductor manufacture, competition resumed outside the precompetitive space, and SEMATECH went on to become a successful company with global reach.
Could this model be applicable to cancer drug development, where failure of new agents to show substantial benefit, often in late stages of development (phase III), is all too common an event? On February 24, 2004, stakeholders from academia, the National Cancer Institute (NCI), and industry convened in Houston at the invitation of the 41st President of the United States, George H. W. Bush, under the auspices of the CEO Roundtable on Cancer to explore whether the SEMATECH model might be applicable to cancer drug development.
As a result of the Houston meeting, the Life Sciences Consortium (LSC) ( Table 1 ) was created as a task force of the CEO Roundtable on Cancer [2] , with the intent of having the member companies work together in a precompetitive environment to solve cancer drug development problems in ways that no company might solve on its own: to be "bold and venturesome," in the words of the former President, the founder of the CEO Roundtable on Cancer.
The three areas identified for collaborative improvements were: 1. Improved delivery of cancer drug clinical trials 2. Regulatory streamlining for cancer drug approval 3. Creation of a precompetitive pool of intellectual property for cancer drug development from which all companies, academic centers, and the NCI might improve success in cancer drug discovery and development.
IMPROVED DELIVERY OF CANCER DRUG CLINICAL TRIALS
At the time the LSC began to explore this complex issue, the NCI had just completed its Clinical Trials Working Group review of how to streamline its own clinical trials processes. It had also commissioned Dr. David Dilts to undertake a systems analysis of clinical trial approval and implementation to determine where the bottlenecks to clinical trial delivery were most acute [3] . Contract negotiations could take more than a year, and there was no difference in the time needed to finalize contracts by phase of study. Dilts' process model analysis resonated with LSC members' experience, and it was agreed that the NCI could provide a safe harbor for members to provide redacted contracts for analysis of the language of approved contracts for clinical studies between the industry and academic centers.
The results of the Dilts process model also resonated with NCI-designated Cancer Center directors, and 14 major Cancer Centers added redacted contracts for analysis. The Washington law firm Hogan and Hartson played a major role in the process, much of the work pro bono. In all, there were 49 redacted contracts and 29 study agreements available for analysis, with even distribution from the companies and the Cancer Centers: an example of evidence-based analysis. Although the starting points for negotiation between companies and Cancer Centers were often divergent, there was 70% convergence in the language of the actual contracts. Why not begin negotiations from where you are likely to end, and save time in the process? This study allowed the NCI and the CEO Roundtable on Cancer to promulgate their "Common Clauses for Contract Negotiation," with the potential to save considerable time in study delivery [4] . Already, Pfizer has adopted the Common Clauses as a starting point for contract negotiations across all therapeutic areas and Quintiles has made the Common Clauses part of its standard operating procedures. Other companies and cancer centers are certain to follow. Nothing instructs like transparency.
Importantly, this work would not have been possible without the imprimatur and safe harbor of the NCI. In September 2008, the U.S. Department of Justice issued a business review letter [5] agreeing that the Common Clauses were "not likely to be anti-competitive and can be used to help increase efficiency in contract negotiations, potentially reducing costs and shortening the time needed to begin clinical trials." The importance of safe harbors, indeed. The Common Clauses are discussed in the Commentary from NCI Director John Niederhuber in this issue of The Oncologist, and indicate how safe harbors can lead to step change [6] .
REGULATORY STREAMLINING OF CANCER DRUG APPROVALS
Comprehensive safety data are collected by companies seeking an initial approval of a new cancer drug in a given disease, and that is appropriate. Industry often collects the same comprehensive safety data for new indications for drugs that have already been approved, whereas NCI Cooperative Group trials that might lead to new indications may collect far less. At issue is whether optimal data collection for new indications needs to be as comprehensive as for the initial application.
This was a question raised at a recent meeting sponsored by the Engelberg Center for Health Care Reform at the Brookings Institution, in collaboration with Friends of Cancer Research (FOCR), the American Association for Cancer Research, and the American Society of Clinical Oncology (ASCO). Once again, a safe harbor, this time a professional association (ASCO) and a patient advocacy group (FOCR), will allow an evidence-based review of how much safety data are needed for supplemental approvals. A safe, precompetitive harbor will allow data from different (and competitive) companies (Genentech, Novartis Oncology, and GlaxoSmithKline) and the NCI Cooperative Group Program (Cancer and Leukemia Group B) to be compared and contrasted. The result could lead to streamlined clinical trials for new indications for approved drugs by industry and more robust data capture for new indications by the NCI Cooperative Groups. This initiative is described more fully in Mark McClellan and Joshua Benner's commentary on the Brookings Institution/FOCR meeting in this issue of The Oncologist [7] . That article again articu- lates how safe harbors might contribute to step change. Importantly, the LSC has been invited to join this effort, consistent with the group's recognition that this is an area where companies might work together in a precompetitive safe harbor.
Another thought-provoking discussion was led by David Epstein, who shared the current challenges that industry encounters during drug development. His vision for the restructuring of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration with respect to oncology product registration is also published in this issue of The Oncologist, and it warrants serious consideration [8] .
CREATION OF A PRECOMPETITIVE POOL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY FOR CANCER DRUG DEVELOPMENT
This third priority of the LSC is the essence of the comparison of the current needs for cancer drug development and the successful example of SEMATECH in the semiconductor industry. Collectively, the members of the LSC represent a significant proportion of the investment in global development of new cancer drugs. They, like the semiconductor manufacturers of the 1980s, need to improve the business model for successful development of their important products, perhaps in a precompetitive environment. What is the obstacle, the density and heat, of cancer drug development? Without doubt, it is biomarkers.
Drug development in cardiovascular disease is relatively straightforward: blood pressure and cholesterol profiles are accepted surrogate endpoints. Similarly, drug development in HIV/AIDS has been simplified by the acceptance of viral burden as a surrogate endpoint for drug efficacy. Biomarkers offer this same potential for cancer drug development, but to date they do not exist. Instead, progression-free survival (sometimes difficult to assess) or overall survival (sometimes requiring significant time) are the crude 20th century endpoints for drug approval in an area of medicine in which the science has clearly entered the 21st century.
There is no doubt that the development of biomarkers as an endpoint for "go-no-go" decisions within companies is reduplicative and reminiscent of the lack of standards that plagued the semiconductor manufacturers of the 1980s. What can we learn from SEMATECH and the more recent examples of the potential value of safe harbors of the NCI in Common Clauses language and Brookings/FOCR optimal datasets for supplement drug approval [9]? Potentially, much.
The NCI is invested in the importance of biomarkers in cancer drug development, as is industry. Perhaps the step change offered by the safe harbor examples to which we have alluded in the areas of Common Clauses contract language and optimal datasets for new indications for approved cancer drugs is to create a new safe harbor for biomarker development.
The cancer drug development community should consider a new precompetitive environment in which major companies would present their biomarker programs for cancer drug development, under confidentiality, to the NCI. The NCI would gain a unique perspective unobservable to its individual industry partners, as a precompetitive safe harbor, where there is overlap and redundancy, where there are gaps, and where there is promise to validate cancer-related biomarkers that might enable cancer drug development across companies and academia. The NCI would select the most promising partners for codevelopment of biomarkers, and when these are ready as predictive or surrogate endpoints, share them with the academic and industry communities at large. The research would be precompetitive, the risks would be shared, and collaboration would replace competition: important step change in a new safe harbor.
Gregory Curt, M.D.
Chairman, Life Sciences Consortium of the CEO Roundtable on Cancer

